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Appellant Holladay Towne Center LLC ("HTC"), by and through undersigned 
counsel, respectfully submits its Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code. Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Whether the trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment dismissing 
HTC's claims on the ground that HTC failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, because 
the facts demonstrated that the Holladay City Planning Commission and/or City Council had 
effectively rejected HTC's land use Application, and that appeal to those administrative 
bodies would have been absolutely futile? 
Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for correctness. Newman v. Sonnenberg, 2003 UT App. 401, 81 P.3d 808. 
Preservation of Issue: See Holladay Towne Center's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss (R. 70-121, including at 79), 
Transcript of Hearing, May 14, 2007. (R. 179, including at 2,5, 14-16.) 
2. Whether the trial court incorrectly granted summary judgment dismissing 
HTC's First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Claims for Relief, on the ground that HTC did not 
file written notice of a claim before maintaining an action, pursuant to the Utah 
Governmental Immunity Act, Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401, because the Act does not apply 
to claims seeking equitable relief, but only to claims for damages? 
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Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the trial court's grant of summary 
judgment for correctness. Newman v. Sonnenherg, 2003 UT App. 401, 81 P.3d 808. 
Preservation of Issue: See Holladay Towne Center's Memorandum in Opposition 
to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss (R. 70-121), Transcript of 
Hearing, May 14,2007. (R. 179). 
3. Whether the trial court incorrectly dismissed HTC's Second Claim for Relief 
("Vested Rights"), for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted, on the ground 
that Utah law does not recognize a claim for 'Vested rights," when HTC was entitled to 
approval of its Application based on the zoning ordinances in effect when the Application 
was submitted, and before the City amended its zoning ordinances specifically to exclude 
HTC's Application. 
Standard of Review: The appellate court reviews the trial court's dismissal pursuant 
to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for correctness. St. Benedict's Dev. Co. v. St. Benedict's 
Hospital, 811 P.2d 1994 (Utah 1991). The appellate court is obliged to construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to HTC and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its 
favor. Dismissal is to be upheld only if it appears to a certainty that HTC would not be 
entitled to relief under any set of facts which could be proved to be true. Whipple v. American 
Forklrrig. Co., 910 P.2d 1218 (Utah 1996); Heiner v. Groves & Sons, Co., 790 P.2d 107 
(Utah App. 1990). 
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Preservation of Issue: See Holladay Towne Center's Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment and to Dismiss (R. 70-121), Transcript of 
Hearing, May 14, 2007 (R. 179). 
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS 
The District Court relied upon the following statutes and ordinances: Utah Code Ann. 
Utah Code Ann. 10-9a-801(l), and Sections 13.84.100 (Addendum ("Add.") 1), and 13-
84.110 (Add. 2.) of the Holladay City Code. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
HTC's appeal arises out of the wrongful rejection by Holladay City ("Holladay" or 
"the City") of HTC's Application ("Application") to construct a Walgreen's pharmacy in 
Holladay. HTC filed the Application on January 30,2006, and met with City officials over 
the next two months to secure its approval. The Application met all applicable zoning 
standards and requirements. At about 4:50 in the afternoon on March 30,2006, however, the 
City hand-delivered to HTC correspondence ("Denial and Rejection") (Add. 3-4.) which 
purported to deny and reject HTC's Application. The Denial and Rejection was signed by 
the City's Community and Development Director, who stated in part that he had been 
instructed by the Planning Commission to reject the Application. 
Literally moments after the City delivered the Denial and Rejection, the City Council 
conducted a five-minute special meeting, and enacted a six-month moratorium on new land 
use applications in the HVC zone. At the end of the moratorium, the City enacted new 
zoning ordinances that excluded HTC's project and Application. 
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HTC filed its Complaint on May 1, 2006. The Complaint alleged six Claims for 
Relief: (1) Holladay's purported denial of HTCs Application was arbitrary, capricious, in 
bad faith, and/or illegal; (2) HTC had a vested right to develop its property pursuant to its 
Application; (3) Holladay's denial of the Application is a taking in violation of both the U.S. 
and Utah State Constitutions; (4) Holladay's zoning standards are facially invalid because 
they are overly vague and ambiguous; (5) Holladay is estopped by its bad faith actions from 
denying HTC the opportunity to develop its property as proposed by its Application and (6) 
Holladay's decision was improperly based on public clamor. (R. 1-5.) 
On its First, Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Claims for Relief, HTC sought equitable 
relief requiring the City to approve the Application. (Id.) On the Third Claim for Relief, 
HTC sought damages in an amount to be determined at trial. (Id.) 
Before any discovery was conducted, Holladay filed a Motion to Dismiss (R. 19-21) 
and a Motion for Summary Judgment (R.15-18). Following argument R. 179), the Court 
entered a Memorandum Decision (Add. 7-11), and Judgment and Order dated June 18,2007. 
(Add. 13-17.) The District Court entered summary judgment dismissing all of HTC's claims, 
holding that HTC "failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by appealing the March 30, 
2006 decision to either the Planning commission or the City Council, as required by Holladay 
Ordinances§§ 13-84.100 and 13-84.110." (Add. 1443.) The District Court further entered 
summary7 judgment dismissing all of HTC's claims, holding that HTC failed to 4fcfile a written 
notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an action," pursuant to Section 63-30d-401 
of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act ("UGIA"). (Add. 15, If 5.) 
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Finally, the District Court dismissed HTC's Second (Vested Rights) and Sixth (Public 
Clamor) Claims for Relief, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts, and all reasonable inferences, which must be accepted as true for purposes 
of summary judgment and in opposition to a motion to dismiss, are: 
1. On January 30,2006, HTC filed with the City an application ("Application"), 
for Conditional Use, Site Plan, and Sign Approval, to construct a Walgreen's drugstore in 
Holladay. (R. 85, U 1.) HTC's property (the "Property") lay within the City's Holladay 
Village Center zone ("HVC zone"). The Application met all City zoning ordinances and 
requirements, including parking, landscaping, and building height. (R. 87, fflf 6-7.) 
2. By correspondence dated February 24, 2006, Holladay's Community 
Development Director requested HTC to provide additional information for a Planning 
Commission work session on March 7, 2006. (R. 87-88, % 8.) Although none of the 
requested information was consistent with or required by the City's zoning ordinances, HTC 
responded to the request through a series of meetings with the Holladay Design Review 
Board, city staff, the Planning Commission, the Mayor, and the City Council. (R. 88, If 9.) 
HTC's Application was placed on the agenda for the March 7 Planning Commission work 
session, and the requested information was discussed extensively at the work session. (R. 
88,^10 & 114-16.) 
3. At 4:50 p.m., on March 30,2006, Holladay hand-delivered to HTC the Denial 
and Rejection of HTC's Application. (Add. 3-4; R. 88, ^ f 12.) The Denial and Rejection was 
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signed by the City's Community Development Director, and purported to identify, for the 
first time, new deficiencies in the Application. (Add. 3-4; R. 89, *|f 11.) Prior to receipt of 
the Denial and Rejection, HTC had never been told that its Application did not comply with 
any applicable zoning ordinance, or that its Application would be denied. To the contrary, 
the City had affirmatively represented that HTCs Application complied with all applicable 
zoning ordinances, and led HTC to believe that the Application had been positively received 
and was being processed accordingly. (R. 89, ^  11,13.)[ 
4. The Denial and Rejection further represented that the Application had been 
denied at the instruction of the Planning Commission: 
The current plan, as drafted, cannot be approved by the Planning Commission 
and we, as staff, have been instructed by the Planning Commission not to bring 
applications before them that do not comply. 
(Add. 3.) (Emphasis added.) The Denial and Rejection was ccM to Jim Palmer, the Chair of 
the Planning Commission. (Id.) 
5. Literally moments after the City delivered the Denial and Rejection to HTC, 
the Holladay City Council held a special meeting. The sole purpose of the meeting, which 
was over in five minutes, was to place a six-month moratorium on new land use applications 
in the HVC zone. (R. 89, % 12; Add. 5-6.) 
!The Denial and Rejection enclosed HTCs Application and Filing Fee of 
$1,046.45, which HTC had paid on January 30, 2006, and which Holladay had accepted 
and cashed. (Add. 3; 92-110). 
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6. Within ten days after receipt of the Denial and Rejection, HTC representatives 
spoke with the City's Community Development Director. As a result of that communication, 
HTC met with City staff, the Mayor, and members of the City Council, throughout the 
moratorium. HTC was repeatedly told that HTC should continue to submit new site plans 
and architectural drawings, which would lead to approval of HTC's Application. In good 
faith, HTC attended meetings and spent thousands of dollars on new drawings and plans in 
reliance on the statements by City officials. (R. 89-90, ^13-14 . ) 
7. At the end of the six month moratorium, the City Council revised its zoning 
ordinances specifically to exclude HTC's Application and project. (R. 89, f 12.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
HTC's appeal presents important issues based on settled Utah law applied to unusual 
but compelling facts and circumstances. Utah law has long recognized, in various contexts, 
that there is no duty to exhaust administrative remedies when the pursuit of those remedies 
would be futile or result in injustice or oppression. The District Court incorrectly granted 
summary judgment dismissing all of HTC's claims, because the facts and reasonable 
inferences prove that Holladay's entire administrative process was inoperative and 
unavailable to HTC. 
Holladay's ordinances require the denial of a land use application to be appealed to 
the Planning Commission and then the City Council. Holladay City hand-delivered the 
Denial and Rejection of HTC's Application at 4:50 p.m., on March 30, 2006. The Denial 
and Rejection stated that Application could not be approved by the Planning Commission and 
that City Staff had been instructed by the Planning Commission to reject it. 
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Moments after Holladay delivered the Denial and Rejection, the City Council enacted 
a six-month moratorium on new land use applications. At the end of the moratorium, and 
after several of its members reviewed HTC's plans and drawings, the City Council amended 
Holladay's ordinances to specifically exclude HTC's Application. 
The only conclusion to be drawn from these facts and inferences (identified in greater 
detail, infra) is that City staff, the Planning Commission, and the City Council coordinated 
their conduct in an attempt to ensure that HTC's Application would never be approved, even 
though the Application complied with all zoning requirements at the time of filing. Because 
appeal to the Planning Commission or the City Council was unequivocally futile, the District 
Court incorrectly granted summary judgment for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. 
The District Court also incorrectly granted summary judgment dismissing HTC's 
First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth Claims for Relief on the ground that HTC failed to provide 
notice of its claims pursuant to the UGIA. Those claims seek equitable relief-an order of the 
court requiring Holladay to approve HTC's Application-and the UGIA applies only to claims 
for damages. 
Finally, this Court should reverse the District Court's Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of 
HTC's Second Claim for Relief-that HTC has a vested right to approval of its Application. 
Utah law recognizes that an owner is entitled to approval if the proposed development meets 
the zoning requirements in existence at the time of his application. That is the essence of 
HTC's Second Claim for Relief, and the District Court erred by dismissing it. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT WRONGLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
DISMISSING HTCS CLAIMS, BECAUSE PURSUING ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDIES UNEQUIVOCALLY WAS FUTILE. 
This Court should reverse the District Court's summary judgment that HTC "failed 
to exhaust its administrative remedies by appealing the March 30,2006 decision to either the 
Planning Commission or the City Council, as required by Holladay Ordinances §§ 13.84.100 
and 13.84-110." 2 The facts and reasonable inferences establish that appeal to either body 
unequivocally was futile, because the Planning Commission directed the denial and rejection 
of HTC's Application, and the City Council immediately enacted a moratorium on new 
applications and then revised its zoning ordinances specifically to exclude HTC's 
Application. 
A. The Utah Courts Have Long Recognized A Futility and Injustice 
Exception to the Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Doctrine. 
This Court and the Utah Supreme Court have long recognized that administrative 
remedies need not be exhausted where exhaustion would be pointless or futile, or where there 
is a likelihood of injustice or oppression. In Nebeker v. Utah State Tax Com V?., 2001 UT 74, 
2Holladay Ordinance 13.84.100 states: 
Any person shall have the right to appeal the decision of the community 
development director to the planning commission by filing a letter with the 
planning commission within ten (10) days of the director's decision, stating the 
reason for the appeal and requesting a hearing before the planning commission 
at the earliest regular meeting of the commission. (Add. 1.) 
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34 P.3d 180, the Supreme Court held that "[exceptions to this rule exist in unusual 
circumstances where it appears that there is a likelihood that some oppression or injustice is 
occurring such that it would be unconscionable not to review the alleged grievance or where 
it appears that exhaustion would serve no useful purpose." Id., ^  14, quoting Johnson v. Utah 
State Retirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980)(fctExhaustion of administrative 
remedies may not be necessary when it would serve no useful purpose."); State Tax Comm 'n 
v. Iverson, 782 P.2d 519, 524 (Utah 1989) (same); Condie v. Condie, 2006 UT App. 243,1f 
15, 139 P.3d 271, 276 ('it is well established that the law does not require litigants to do a 
futile or vain act."). 
For the reasons stated below, the futility exception applies with force here. 
B. The Supreme Court's Decision in Patterson v. American Fork City 
Establishes that HTC's Administrative Appeal Was Futile. 
In holding that HTC failed to exhaust ita administrative remedies, the District Court 
relied on the Utah Supreme Court's decision in Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 
7,67 P.3d 466. The Patterson Court's holding, however, demonstrates precisely why HTC's 
appeal to either the Holladay City Planning Commission or the City Council was absolutely 
futile. 
The Patterson Court rejected a landowner's claim that an administrative appeal of the 
denial of its land use application was futile, stating that allegations of''unfairness in the day-
to-day relationship between the [owner] and the city staff do not support a claim that the 
entire administrative appeals process is inoperative or unavailable." 2003 UT 7, % 20, 67 
10 
P.3d at 472. Unlike Patterson, the facts here (and the reasonable inferences to which HTC 
was entitled on summary judgment), establish that the entire administrative process was 
inoperative or unavailable to HTC. To succinctly summarize: 
On January 30, 2006, HTC filed its Application to construct a Walgreen's drugstore 
in Holladay. (Statement of Facts, supra, ^ 1.) The Application met all requirements of 
Holladay's applicable zoning ordinances. (Id.) Pursuant to a request from the City's 
Community Development Director, HTC provided additional information for a Planning 
Commission work session on March 7,2006. HTC provided the information through a series 
of meetings with the Holladay Design Review Board, city staff, the Planning Commission, 
the Mayor and the City Council. HTC's Application was placed on the agenda, and the 
requested information was discussed extensively at the March 7 Planning Commission work 
session. (Id., ^2.) 
Holladay hand-delivered its Denial and Rejection of HTC's Application on March 30, 
2006, at 4:50 p.m. Signed by the City's Community Development Director, the Denial and 
Rejection purported to identify, for the first time, new deficiencies in the Application. 
Before then, the City had never before told HTC that its Application did not comply with 
applicable zoning ordinances, or that it would be denied. To the contrary, the City had 
affirmatively represented to HTC that its Application complied with all applicable zoning, 
and led HTC to believe that the Application had been positively received and was being 
processed accordingly. (Id., ^3.) 
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The Denial and Rejection further represented that the Application had been denied 
at the instruction of the Planning Commission: 
The current plan, as drafted, cannot be approved by the Planning Commission 
and we, as staff, have been instructed by the Planning Commission not to bring 
applications before them that do not comply. 
(/J., If 4.) (Emphasis added.) 
Immediately after delivery of the Denial and Rejection, the Holladay City Council 
held a special meeting. The sole purpose of the meeting, which lasted no longer than five 
minutes, was to place a six-month moratorium on new land use applications in the HVC 
zone, where HTC's Property is located. (Id,, f 5.) 
During the moratorium, HTC met or communicated with City staff, the Mayor, and 
members of the City Council, all of whom encouraged HTC to submit site plans and 
architectural renderings. As a result, HTC understood that the submission of these plans and 
renderings would lead of approval of its Application, and in reliance on the City's 
representations, spent thousands of dollars preparing new plans and drawings that it 
submitted to the City. At the end of the moratorium, however, the City Council revised its 
zoning ordinance for the Holladay Village Center Zone to specifically exclude HTC's 
Walgreen's Application. (Id., Iflf 6-7.) 
Given these facts, and unlike the facts in Patterson, there can be no conclusion but 
that the entire administrative process was inoperative and unavailable to HTC. The Denial 
and Rejection specifically stated that the Application "cannot be approved" by the Planning 
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Commission, and that the Community Development Director had been "instructed" by the 
Planning Commission not to bring the Application.3 
It would be disingenuous at best to suggest that an appeal to the Planning Commission 
provided HTC with a meaningful administrative remedy; by definition, an appeal to the body 
that instructed the Development Director not to present the Application in the first place is 
the essence of futility. 
It is also clear that further appeal to the City Council, pursuant to Holladay Ordinance 
13.84.110, was equally futile. On summary judgment, HTC was entitled to the compelling 
inference that the only reason that the City Council held a special five-minute meeting to pass 
an urgent moratorium on new land use applications, moments after delivering the Denial and 
Rejection, was to ensure that HTC's Application was dead. HTC also was entitled to the 
inference that Holladay City Council considered the moratorium necessary because of the 
fact (or risk) that the Application complied with Holladay's existing zoning, and should have 
been approved. 
During the moratorium, City staff, the Mayor, and City Council members met with 
HTC representatives and reviewed HTC's plans and drawings. HTC submitted the plans and 
drawings because HTC understood that the submission would lead to approval of its 
Application. Instead, the City Council amended its zoning ordinance to exclude the 
3Further, the Denial and Rejection was cc'd to Jim Palmer, the Chair of the 
Planning Commission. (Add. 4.) On summary judgment, HTC was entitled to the 
reasonable inference that the Planning Commission w as aware of, and either authorized 
or ratified the rejection, as well as the representations that the Planning Commission 
could not approve the Application, and had given instructions for its denial and rejection. 
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Application. (Id., \ 7.) It would defy common sense to suggest that the Holladay City 
Council would uphold HTCs appeal of the Denial and Rejection, when its every action was 
to ensure that HTCs Application was never approved and its project never built. 
These plain facts establish that the administrative process was unavailable and 
inoperative. On summary judgment, HTC was entitled to the compelling inference that City 
staff, the Planning Commission, and the City Council coordinated their actions to foreclose 
HTCs Application. Unlike the property owners in Patterson, HTC has not "leap-frogged 
over the entire administrative process/' 2003 UT 7, U 17, but has been rejected by Holladay's 
staff, Planning Commission, and City Council. 
This Court therefore should reverse the District Court's summary judgment dismissing 
all of HTCs claims for failure to exhaust its administrative remedies. 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY GRANTED SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT DISMISSING HTCS CLAIMS FOR EQUITABLE RELIEF, 
BECAUSE THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS OF THE UGIA APPLY ONLY 
TO CLAIMS FOR MONEY DAMAGES, 
The District Court committed clear error by entering summary judgment dismissing 
HTCs First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Grounds for Relief, on the ground that HTC "failed 
to provide any written notice of the claims alleged in this complaint prior to filing this 
complaint as required by Section 63-30d-401 of the UGIA. (Add. 15, If 6.) 
HTC, however, had no duty to comply with the notice provisions of the UGIA. 
because HTCs First, Second, Fourth, and Fifth claims seek equitable relief, in the form of 
an "Order requiring the City to approve the Application.'' (R.5.) The UGIA applies only to 
claims for money damages. The Act defines a "claim" as 
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any asserted demand for or cause of action for money or damages, whether 
arising under the common law, under state constitutional provision, or under 
state statutes, against a governmental entity, or against a governmental 
employee in the employee's personal capacity. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-30(1-102(1). 
Numerous Utah courts have recognized and held that the UGIA does not apply to 
claims for equitable relief. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Fork City, 2003 UT 7, ]flf 12-13, 
67 P.3d 466, 470-71 (equitable claims "are generally not subject to the UGIA's notice 
provisions," and failure to comply with notice provisions bars "non-equitable state-law 
claims") (emphasis added); Houghton v. Dept. of Health, 2005 UT 63, 125 P.3d 860, 866 n. 
3 ("this court has recognized that equitable claims are not governed by the notice of claim 
provisions of the Immunity Act. . . . Thus, a plaintiff asserting an equitable claim is not 
bound by the notice requirements of the Immunity Act."); American Tierra Corp. v. City of 
West Jordan, 840 P.2d 757,759-60 (Utah 1992) ("This court long has recognized a common 
law exception to governmental immunity for equitable claims. Neither the passage of time 
nor the enactment of the Utah Governmental Immunity Act has eroded this exception"); El 
Rancho Enters., Inc. v. Murray City Corp., 565 P.2d 778, 779 (Utah 1977) (uThe common 
law exception to governmental immunity pertaining to equitable claims has long been 
recognized in this jurisdiction."). 
Because the UGIA plainly and clearly does not apply to claims for equitable relief, 
and because HTC was not required to provide notice of its equitable claims for relief before 
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filing its complaint, this court should reverse the District Court's summary judgment 
dismissing HTCs First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief. 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT INCORRECTLY DISMISSED HTCS SECOND 
CLAIM FOR RELIEF, FOR VESTED RIGHTS. 
The District Court also erred in dismissing HTCs Second Claim for Relief, which 
alleges: "'Under the facts above, Plaintiff has a vested right to the approval of its 
development of the Property." (R. 4.) The District Court dismissed this claim, holding that 
"Utah does not recognize a claim for vested rights," and that HTCs claim for vested rights 
fails "to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." (Add. 15.) 
The District's Court's conclusion is wrong. Utah courts consistently have recognized 
claims alleging vested rights. In Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388 
(Utah 1980), the Supreme Court held that 
an applicant is entitled to a building permit or subdivision approval if his 
proposed development meets the zoning requirements in existence at the time 
of his application and it he proceeds with reasonable diligence, absent a 
compelling, countervailing public interest. 
617P.2dat396. 
In Scherbel v. Salt Lake City Corp., 758 P.2d 897 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court 
stated that "the question of when rights to a building permit vest under a zoning ordinance 
is not a novel one." 758 P.2d at 900. The Scherbel Court then characterized the property 
owners' claim in Western Land Equities as a claim for vested rights: 
16 
The plaintiffs sought a determination, as a matter of law, that they had a vested 
right to develop a subdivision under the earlier zoning ordinance. We held that 
an applicant for subdivision approval or a building permit is entitled to 
favorable action if the application conforms to the zoning ordinance in effect 
at the time of the application, unless changes in the zoning ordinances are 
pending which would prohibit the use applied for, or unless the municipality 
can show a compelling reason for exercising retroactively to the date of the 
application. 
Id. 
This is the essence of HTCs Second Claim for Relief: HTC is entitled to develop its 
Property pursuant to its Application. The Application met all applicable zoning ordinances 
and requirements, and was wrongly rejected by the City as a pretext to enable the City to 
enact a moratorium and amend its zoning ordinances to prohibit HTC's project. 
Because these are allegations on which relief can be granted, the District Court erred 
in dismissing HTC's Second Claim for Relief, and this Court should reverse that dismissal.4 
4The District Court also dismissed, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), HTC's 
Sixth Claim for Relief (Public Clamor). HTC does not appeal the dismissal of that claim. 
17 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, this Court should reverse the District Court's (i) 
summary judgment dismissing all of HTC's claims for failure to exhaust administrative 
remedies, when pursuit of administrative remedies would have been futile; (ii) summary 
judgment dismissing HTC's First, Second, Fourth and Fifth Claims for Relief, because the 
notice provisions of the UGIA do not apply to claims for equitable relief; and (iii) dismissal 
of HTC's Second Claim for Relief, alleging that HTC has a vested right to develop its 
Property pursuant to its Application. 
Respectfully submitted this Vf da^jafpecember, 2007. 
PerrmR^i ove 
Clyde Snow Sessions & Swenson 
Attorneys for Appellant Holladay Towne Center LLC 
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I, hereby certify thai I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing document to be served 
by U.S. Mail on this yday of December, 2007, postage prepaid and correctly addressed to the 
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PATRICK S. MALONE 
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13.84.100: APPEAL OF COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT DIRECTOR 
DECISION: 
Any person shall have the right to appeal the decision of the community development director 
to the planning commission by filing a letter with the planning commission within ten (10) days 
of the community development director's decision, stating the reason for the appeal and 
requesting a hearing before the planning commission at the earliest regular meeting of the 
commission. (1999 Code) 
13.84.110: APPEAL OF PLANNING COMMISSION DECISION: 
A. Authority: Any person shall have the right to appeal to the city council any decision rendered 
by the planning commission by filing in writing and in triplicate, stating the reasons for the 
appeal with the city council within ten (10) days following the date upon which the decision 
is made by the planning commission. After receiving the appeal, the city council may 
reaffirm the planning commission decision, remand the matter to the planning commission 
for further consideration, or set a date for a public meeting. 
B. Notification To Planning Commission: The city council shall notify the planning commission 
of the date of the review, in writing, at least seven (7) days preceding the date set for 
hearing so that the planning commission may prepare the record for the hearing. 
C. Determination By City Council: The city council, after proper review of the decision of the 
planning commission, may affirm, reverse, alter or remand for further review and 
consideration any action taken by the planning commission. (1999 Code) 
HAND DELIVERED 
March 30, 2006 
Tom Hulbert 
Holladay Towne Center, LLC 
515 West Pickett Circle, Suite 400 
SLC, Utah 84115 
Dear Tom, 
We received a conditional use site plan application from Holladay Towne Center, LLC 
on 1/30/06 for a Walgreens at approximately 2263 Holladay Road. The Community 
Development Department's request for a revised application dated 2/24/06, for the 
proposed development (per our attached letter) has not been satisfied. The current plan, 
as drafted, cannot be approved by the Planning Commission and we, as staff, have been 
instructed by the Planning Commission not to bring applications before them that do not 
comply. 
To date we have not received a revision to your plans that complies with our ordinances. 
Therefore you are informed that your application as filed is hereby denied and rejected 
based upon noncompliance with the ordinances and we cannot process your application 
further. Please find enclosed your application and fee. 
Specifically, the application fails to comply with the provisions of the applicable zone, C-
2, and with other applicable ordinances, including, but not limited to, the following 
deficiencies: 
1. The number of parking stalls shown on the plan does not meet the minimum of 1 
stall per 200 square feet of retail floor space. (Section 13.80.040) 
2. At least 3 of the parking stalls shown on the plan may not be located in the 
required front landscaped yard area per Section 13.76.155. 
3. The building is located in the required front yard setback of 20 feet in violation of 
Section 13.62.090(B) and does not comply with Section 13.76.155 which requires 
live plant materials in the front yard area for all main uses in the C-2 zone. 
4. The site plan as submitted is in conflict with the development to the west. We 
have not received sufficient information to resolve that conflict. Specifically, the 
application does not show the location of all existing structures on the subject 
property and adjoining properties (completely dimensioned, including utility 
lines, poles, etc.) per Section 13.02.080 (D). 
5. As per your letter dated 3/21/06, regarding the site plan for the Holladay Point 
Center (Smith Brubaker) indicating it was not be part of the Walgreen application, 
we do not consider this to be a completed portion of the application as required. 
C I T Y of H O L L A D A Y 
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6. The site is subject to a T foot roadway dedication along Murray Holladay Road 
which is spelled out in Section 15.28.010 of the City of Holladay Municipal Code 
and as referred to in Appendix A,- Roadway Classification, of the City's General 
Plan. 
Respectfully, 
Paul Allred, Community Development Director 





MINUTES OF THE SPECIAL 
HOLLADAY CITY COUNCIL MEETING 
Thursday, March 30, 2006 
5:00 p.m. 
Council Chambers 
4707 South Holladay Blvd. 
HoIIaday, Utah 84117 
ATTENDANCE 
Mayor Dennis Webb 
Lynn Pace 
Patricia Pignanelli 
Hugo Diederich - by phone 
Steven R. Peterson 
Grant Orton 
I. Welcome - Mayor Dennis Webb 
Mayor Webb called the meeting to order at 5:15 p.m. and welcomed those in attendance. 
II. Pledge of Allegiance 
The Pledge of Allegiance was led by Paul Allred. 
HI. Public Comments 
There were none. 
IV. Consideration of Ordinance 06-05 Establishing Temporary Restrictions Regarding 
Applications for Re-zoning Requests, Conditional Use Permits and Building Permits in 
the Area of the Holladay Village Center 
Council Member Pace commented that there have been several drafts of this ordinance, the final version 
has numbered paragraphs 1-7 and is dated March 30. In terms of the exhibit it will be in color. The area 
in question is inside the green line which is basically the RDA area. 
Council Member Orton commented that the ordinance is very self-explanatory it tells why we are doing 
this and the urgency. 
Council Member Orton moved to adopt Ordinance 06-05. Council Member Diederich seconded the 
motion. The Council roll call vote was as follows: Council Members Diederich. Orton. Pace. Pignanelli. 
Peterson and Mayor Webb in favor. Ordinance 06-05 was adopted by a unanimous vote. 
Holladay City Special Council \ tinutes 3-30-06 1 
City Staff 
Randy Fitts, City Manager 
Craig Hall, Attorney 
Stephanie Carlson, City Recorder 
III. Adjourn 
Council Member Orton moved to adjourn. Council Member Peterson seconded the motion. The meeting 
adjourned at 5:20 p.m. 
/ hereby certify that the foregoing represents a true, accurate and complete record of the Holladay 
City Council meeting held Thursday, March 30, 2006 
Stephanie N. Carlson, CMC Dennis R. Webb, Mayor 
Holladay City Recorder 
Minutes Approved: 4-13-06 
Holladay City Special Council Minutes 3-30-06 2 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER, LLC, a 
U t a h l i m i t e d l i a b i l i t y c o m p a n y , 
P l a i n t i f f , 
v s . 




Case No. 060907178 
Honorable GLEN^fo, ggfflgj
 C 0 U R 7 
Third Judicial District 




J>klj LAKE O.^UNl > 
deputy CirtrK 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Holladay City's Motion for Summary Judgment and Motion to 
Dismiss. The Court heard oral argument with respect to the 
motions on May 7, 2007. Following the hearing, the matters were 
taken under advisement. 
The Court having considered the motions and memoranda and 
for the good cause shown, hereby enters the following ruling. 
On January 30, 2006, Plaintiff filed a Development Review 
Application with Holladay City, centered around the construction 
of a Walgreen's Drugstore at 2263 East Murray Holladay Road. On 
February 24, 2006, Defendant sent Plaintiff a letter requesting 
additional information. On March 30, 2006, Defendant informed 
Plaintiff that the Application was denied. 
In a combined memorandum in support of both motions, 
Defendant argues Plaintiff never appealed the decision announced 
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in the March 30, 2006 letter and as a result, Plaintiff has 
failed to allege that it exhausted its administrative remedies as 
required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801. Therefore, contends 
Defendant, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which 
relief can be granted on any of its claims. Further, asserts 
Defendant, Plaintiff did not provide notice of any claim against 
Holladay City before commencing this action and as a result, has 
failed to allege that it provided written notice as required by 
the Governmental Immunity Act. Moreover, contends Defendant, 
Plaintiff has failed to plead the required elements of a claim 
for "vested rights," estoppel, and facial invalidity and there is 
no cause of action for "public clamor." For these reasons, 
argues Defendant, dismissal is appropriate. 
Additionally, asserts Defendant, summary judgment is 
appropriate based upon Plaintiff's failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies and failure to provide written notice 
prior to commencing the action. 
Plaintiff opposes the motions arguing the Application they 
submitted complied with all the requirements in effect at the 
time and as a result, its development plan was vested. In light 
of this, it is Plaintiff's position summary judgment cannot be 
had. Moreover, asserts Plaintiff, because it is not seeking an 
Page 2 
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appeal authority to "hear and decide" a "variance" or an appeal 
from a "decision applying the relevant land use ordinances," but 
rather, is asking for a "determination that the Property has a 
vested right to develop ... pursuant to the Application" it 
submitted, it is Plaintiff's position an appeal to authority 
would be futile. Alternatively, argues Plaintiff, the Court 
should find that an informal appeal occurred during the meetings 
between its representatives and the Mayor and City Council 
Members. 
Additionally, asserts Plaintiff, while it may need to comply 
with the Utah Governmental Immunity Act's notice requirements 
when asserting certain causes of action, no such causes of action 
are alleged in this case. 
Finally, argues Plaintiff, it has properly stated a claim 
for estoppel and facial invalidity and if Defendant found the 
Complaint to be vague or ambiguous, the proper response was to 
move for a more definite statement. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-701(1), "[e]ach 
municipality adopting a land uses ordinance shall, by ordinance, 
establish one or more appeal authorities to hear and decide ... 
appeals from decisions applying land use ordinances." Id. In 




HOLLADAY TOWNE v. HOLLADAY CITY MEMORANDUM DECISION 
hear appeals from decisions of the Community Development 
Director. See Holladay Ordinance 13-84.100. The City Council is 
the body to which decisions of the Planning Commission are to be 
appealed. See Holladay Ordinance 13-84.110. 
While Plaintiff contends what it is seeking ("a 
determination that the Property has a vested right to develop ... 
pursuant to the Application") does not qualify as a dispute over 
"a decision applying the relevant land use ordinances," this is 
simply not the case. Indeed, Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief 
asks to have the decision of the City overturned. 
Based upon the forgoing, dismissal for failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies is granted. 
In light of the forgoing ruling, the remaining grounds need 
not be reached. However, for the sake of completeness, the Court 
notes that dismissal for failing to provide the proper notice 
would also be appropriate. Moreover, while Plaintiff would 
likely survive a motion for summary judgment based upon its 
claims of estoppel and facial invalidity, it does not dispute 
that neither its claim for vested rights, nor public clamor, are 
recognized under Utah law. 
Finally, with regard to Plaintiff's argument that the 
moratorium would have made any appeal futile, such argument was 
Page 4 
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not included, nor supported, in any of Plaintiff's briefing. 
Accordingly, although argument was permitted, it was considered 
just that, argument. 
DATED this day of May, 2007. 
GLENN K. IWASAK] 




11. Craig I lull (#1307) 
James K. Tracy (#6668) 
Patricks. Malonc (#8914) 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER LLP 
201 South Main Street, Suite 2000 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2266 
Telephone: (801)320-6700 
Facsimile: (801)359-8256 
Attorneys for Defendant Holladay 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HOLLADAY TOWNE CENTER, LLC, a 
Utah limited liability company, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
HOLLADAY CITY, a Utah municipal 
corporation, 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER GRANTING 
HOLLADAY CITY'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND MOTION 
TO DISMISS 
Case No. 060907178 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
This matter came before the Court pursuant to Holladay City's Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Motion to Dismiss. The Court held oral argument with respect to the motions on 
May 7, 2007. Plaintiff was represented by Bruce Baird. Defendant was represented by James 
K. Tracy and H. Craig Hall. After considering the arguments presented, reviewing the law on this 
FH.tS SISTRiCT CCIOiT 
Third .ludicin! n — nct 
m 1 3 2507 
8y. liiu Uepu.y ' 
City 
UUI3 
matter, and for good cause appearing, the Court makes the following findings of fact, conclusions 
of law, judgment and order: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On January 30, 2006, the Plaintiff Holladay Towne Center, LLC ("Plaintiff') filed 
a Development Review Application with Holiaday City (the "Application"), requesting a 
conditional use permit to construct a Walgreen's Drugstore at 2263 East Murray Holladay Road, 
Holladay, Utah (the "Property"). 
2. On February 24, 2006, Holladay, through its Community Development Director, 
informed the Plaintiff of deficiencies in its Application and requested that the Application and 
site plan be revised. 
3. On March 30, 2006, Holladay sent a letter to the Plaintiff informing Plaintiff that 
the Application was denied and refunding the Plaintiffs application fee. 
4. As required by Utah Code Ann. § 10-9-701(1), Holladay has adopted ordinances 
that require any decision of the Community Development Director to be appealed to the 
Planning Commission and any decision of the Planning Commission to be appealed to the City 
Council. See Holladay Ordinances §§ 13-84.100 and 13-84.110. 
5. Plaintiff did not appeal the March 30, 2006 decision to either the Planning 
Commission or the City Council. 
6. On May 1, 2006, the Plaintiff filed this action seeking, among other things, to 
2 
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obtain approval of its Application by judicial decree. 
7. Prior to filing this action, Plaintiff did not provide to Holladay written notice of 
any claims asserted in this action. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801 provides that w*[n]o person may challenge in district 
court a municipality's land use decision . . . until that person has exhausted the person's 
administrative remedies . . . ." 
2. Each of Plaintiffs claims for relief constitutes challenges to Holladay's March 30, 
2006 land use decision. 
3. Plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies by appealing the March 30, 
2006 decision to either the Planning Commission or the City Council, as required by Holladay 
Ordinances §§ 13-84.100 and 13-84.110. 
4. Because Plaintiff failed to exhaust its administrative remedies, this Court is 
without jurisdiction to entertain any of Plaintiff s claims. See Utah Code Ann. § 10-9a-801; see 
also Patterson v. American Fork City, 67 P.3d 466, 471 (Utah 2003) ("If a developer fails to 
exhaust these administrative remedies prior to filing suit, the suit must be dismissed."); 
Intermoiintain Sports, Inc. v. Dep't of Transportation, 103 P.3d 716, 720-721 (Utah Ct. App. 
2004) (dismissing takings claim where party failed to exhaust administrative remedies) 
3 
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5. Utah Code Ann. § 63-30d-401 requires that any person having a claim against a 
governmental entity "shall file a written notice of claim with the entity before maintaining an 
action" against the governmental entity. "A plaintiffs failure to comply with UGIA's notice of 
claim provisions deprives the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction." Patterson, 67 P.3d at 
470. 
6. Because Plaintiff failed to provide any written notice of the claims alleged in this 
complaint prior to filing this complaint, the Court is without jurisdiction over Plaintiffs claims 
and on this basis as well. 
7. Utah law does not recognize a claim for "vested rights." 
8. Utah law does not recognize a claim for "public clamor." 
JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF DISMISSAL 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, the Court hereby grants 
the Defendant's motion for summary judgment and dismisses, with prejudice, all of Plaintiff s 
claims. In addition, the Court grants the Defendant's motion to dismiss the Second Claim for 
Relief for "vested rights" and the Sixth Claim for Relief for "public clamor" for failure to state a 
claim upon which relief can be granted. 
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,1 DATED this£2_ day of June, 2007. 
THE COURT 
Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki 
Third District Court Judge 
Approved as to form: 
MUTCHINGS BAIRD CURTIS & ASTILL, PLLC 
BY: 
Bruce Baird ^ 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND 
ORDER GRANTING HOLLADAY CITY'S MOTION TO DISMISS was served by United 
j 
States first class mail, postage prepaid, on the tf— day of June, 2007, on the following: 
Bruce R. Baird 
HUTCHINGS BAIRD CURTIS & ASTILL, PLLC 
9537 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84070 
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